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I.

INTRODUCTION

The State of Delaware has long been known to be the home to many large
corporations both private and public. Justice Steele, Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court, has reiterated the prominent reason why many corporations choose
Delaware as the state of their incorporation is the presence of highly
knowledgeable judges within the business law realm, as well as the predictability
1
of its judicial system. Therefore, it is no surprise that 51% of all public
2
companies and 61% of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware.
Nonetheless, the predictability of Delaware’s judicial system may slowly be on the
path to its demise.

* Pepperdine University School of Law J.D. Candidate 2014.
1
Myron T. Steele, Chief Justice, Del. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the Journal of Business,
Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds
For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 376.
2
Steele, supra note 1.
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In April of 2009, the Delaware State Legislature amended the rules
3
governing the resolution of disputes in the Court of Chancery. This law gives the
Court of Chancery “the power to arbitrate business disputes when the parties
request a member of the Court of Chancery, or such other person as may be
4
authorized under rules of the Court, to arbitrate a dispute.” The arbitration
procedure is “intended to preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering costeffective options for resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial,
5
corporate, and technology matters.
In order to have access to the arbitration procedure both parties must
6
consent. Although an agreement does not need to be in place prior to the dispute
7
arising, both parties must consent at the time they submit the dispute to the court.
8
In addition to mutual consent, both parties must also meet certain criteria. Of the
9
parties involved, at least one party must be a “business entity” and one party must
be a citizen of the state of Delaware, although the same party can meet both
10
criteria. If the parties are only seeking monetary damages, then the relief the
11
parties seek must exceed one million dollars.
In essence, the newly enacted bill allows Delaware corporations, and in some
12
cases non-business entities, to elect arbitration as the means of resolving
disputes, with a Delaware Chancery Court presiding judge serving as the
13
arbitrator. On its face, the arbitration program seems like a great cost effective
14
option for many corporations and non-business entities alike.
The program
15
comes at a much lower cost than the traditional option of litigation, all the while
having a highly acclaimed and business savvy Delaware Chancery Court judge
16
presiding over the case as an arbitrator. But much to Delaware’s surprise, the
17
newly enacted Bill was not received with open arms. Instead, litigation has

3

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (West 2013).
Id. § 349(a).
5
Delaware Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012).
6
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 347(a)(1) (West 2013).
7
Id. § 349(a).
8
Id. §§ 349(a), 347(a), (b).
9
Id. § 346(b) (“A ‘business entity’ means a corporation, statutory trust, business trust or
association, a real estate investment trust, a common-law trust, or any other unincorporated business,
including a partnership (whether general (including a limited liability partnership) or limited (including
a limited liability limited partnership)) or a limited liability company.”).
10
Id. §§ 349(a), 347(a)(2)–(3).
11
Id. §§ 349(a), 347(a)(5).
12
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 349(a), 347(a)(4) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2731(1)
(West) (Although one party may be a non-business entity the non-business entity may not be a
consumer. See § 347(a)(4). A consumer is defined as “an individual who purchases or leases
merchandise primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” § 2731(1)).
13
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(a) (West 2013).
14
Steele, supra note 1, at 379.
15
John Q. Lewis, Louis A. Chalten & Nicholas B. Wille, United States: The Delaware Court Of
Chancery Offers New Arbitration Procedures For Confidential, Efficient Resolution Of Significant
Business Disputes, JONES DAY (Feb. 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/delaware_court_of_chancery
(“The fees associated with the arbitration program include $12,000 for filing the petition and $6,000 for
each day of the arbitration hearing. The fees are divided equally between the parties.”).
16
Steele, supra note 1, at 381.
17
Delaware Coal. for Open Gov't. 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012).
4
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ensued and public interest institutions have challenged the confidentiality of
18
Delaware’s arbitration proceeding on claims of unconstitutionality; more
19
specifically, there have been claims of First Amendment violations.
The
plaintiff, Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. (“DelCOG”), argues that
the cases the Delaware Chancery Court hears under this program are, in actuality,
civil litigation cases, simply masked as arbitration proceedings in order to claim
20
the luxury of confidentiality.
DelCOG pleads that the First Amendment
21
establishes a right of public access to civil judicial proceedings, and the
22
procedures at issue are effectively civil judicial proceedings.
Part II of this article will discuss the constitutional analysis the courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, have made in the past regarding
litigation and the test they have employed in their analysis. Part III will analyze
Delaware’s arbitration program and whether it fits within the purview of what
courts in the past have defined as “litigation.” Part IV will discuss the impact, or
lack thereof, of the District Courts holding in Strine. Finally, Part V will end with
a short conclusion.
II.

TRADITIONAL LITIGATION VERSUS ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Criminal Case History

The United States Supreme Court first recognized that the First Amendment
grants the public access to attend and observe court proceedings in Richmond
23
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. In the opinion, seven of the eight participating
judges recognized that, at least in criminal proceedings, there was a long history of
public access to judicial proceedings, and that public access promotes public
confidence in the Judicial Branch of Government and an understanding of how the
24
system works. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the First Amendment right of
public access to judicial proceedings established in Richmond Newspapers by a
clear majority in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of

18
Id. at 498. “The First Amendment provides that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.’” Id. The Fourteenth Amendment extends these prohibitions to the
states. Id.
19
Id.
20
Complaint at 4, Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. The Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
The Hon. John W. Noble, The Hon. Donald F. Parsons, Jr., The Hon. J. Travis Laster, The Hon. Sam
Glasscock, III, The Delaware Court of Chancery, and the State of Delaware, No. CIV.A. 1:11–1015,
2012 WL 3744718 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012) (No. 11:11CV01015), 2011 WL 5042086.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
24
Id. at 577; Further stating:
The right of access to places traditionally open to the public, as criminal trials
have long been, may be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First Amendment
guarantees of speech and press; and their affinity to the right of assembly is not
without relevance. From the outset, the right of assembly was regarded not only
as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the
other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by the
draftsmen.
Id.
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25

Norwalk and once more two years later in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
26
Court of California for the County of Riverside.
B. Civil Case History
Although the aforementioned cases were regarding criminal proceedings, in
Richmond Newspaper, the Supreme Court did address whether public access
applies to civil proceedings, stating in a footnote: “[w]hether the public has a right
to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we note that
27
historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open.”
Consequently, many lower courts have found that this right does in fact apply to
civil proceedings as well, most notably in Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen,
28
which involved a corporate governance dispute. In its ruling, the Third Circuit
held that the “First Amendment guarantee of the public’s . . . right of access to
29
criminal trials is applicable to civil cases.” In finding a history of public access
to civil proceedings, the Third Circuit concluded, “[t]he explanation for and the
importance of this public right of access to civil trials is that it is inherent in the
30
nature of our democratic form of government.” The court in Publicker Industries
further concluded that “to limit the public’s access to civil trials there must be a
showing that the denial serves an important governmental interest and that there is
31
no less restrictive way to serve that governmental interest.” Since Publicker
Industries, the Third Circuit has re-affirmed time and time again that the First
Amendment right of public access does apply to civil judicial proceedings and
32
records.
C. Experience and Logic Test
Accordingly, in order for courts to determine if there is a public right of
access to a particular proceeding or record when faced with such an issue, the rule
33
in the Third Circuit is to apply the “Experience and Logic” Test. In applying the
Experience and Logic Test, the court must consider (1) “whether a given
government proceeding or an analogous proceeding has historically been open to
34
35
the public,” and (2) “whether openness serves a significant societal function.

25

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California for the County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
27
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (1980).
28
Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3rd Cir. 1984).
29
Id. at 1067–68.
30
Id. at 1069 (internal citations omitted).
31
Id. at 1070.
32
Delaware Coal. for Open Gov't. 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 499 (D. Del. 2012); see also In re Cendant
Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 198 (3rd Cir. 2001); U.S. v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1356 (3rd Cir. 1994); Leucadia,
Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157,161 (3rd Cir. 1993); Republic of Philippines
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659 (3rd Cir. 1991).
33
Delaware Coal. for Open Gov't. 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 499 (D. Del. 2012).
34
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and in
Support of Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 11, Del Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc.
v. Strine, CIV.A. No. 1:11–1015, 2012 WL 3744718 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012) (No. 11–01015), 2012
WL 137000 at *11.
26
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36

Once both tests are met, the right to public access attaches. Courts look at both
elements and there is no particular standard on which element has more weight in
37
comparison to the other. For example, a significant public benefit to openness
38
may compensate for the absence of a history of openness.
III. COURTS’ ANALYSIS OF DELAWARE’S ARBITRATION PROCEEDING:
DELCOG V. STRINE
In analyzing Delaware’s arbitration program, prior to the application of the
Logic and Experience Test, the presiding judge in Strine first addressed a threshold
question of whether Delaware “implemented a form of commercial arbitration to
which the Court must apply the logic and experience test,” or whether Delaware
“created a procedure ‘sufficiently like a trial’ such that Publicker Industries
39
governs?” In answering this question, the Court alluded to the fact that simply
labeling something a particular name does not necessarily mean that the event fits
40
within the description or purview of its label.
In turn, simply labeling a
proceeding “arbitration” does not automatically equate that proceeding to an actual
41
arbitration when for all intents and purposes the proceeding is civil litigation. In
analyzing whether Delaware’s arbitration proceeding is in actuality civil litigation
masked as arbitration, the court (1) compared and contrasted the similarities and
differences among Delaware’s arbitration proceeding, arbitration proceedings in
general, and civil litigation; and the court (2) compared and contrasted the role of
42
an arbitrator to the role of a judge.

A. Arbitration Versus Litigation
i. Traditional Arbitration Versus Traditional Litigation
Although arbitration and civil litigation are alike in many ways, they still
43
maintain distinct differences.
In both proceedings, parties select a neutral
44
decision maker to resolve their dispute.
The parties must both consent to

35

Id.
Id.
37
Id.
38
See, e.g., Simone v. Rubin, 733 F.2d 837, 840; see also U.S. v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th
Cir. 1983) (“[T]he lack of an historic tradition of open bail reduction hearings does not bar our
recognizing a right of access to such hearings.”).
39
Delaware Coal. for Open Gov't. 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500 (D. Del. 2012).
40
Id. at 500. (“The label Delaware gives the proceeding offers little guidance. ‘[T]he First
Amendment question cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e., ‘trial’ or otherwise,
particularly where the [proceeding at issue] functions much like a full-scale trial.’”) (internal citations
omitted).
41
Id. (“[T]he First Amendment question cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the event,
i.e., ‘trial’ or otherwise, particularly where the [proceeding at issue] functions much like a full-scale
trial.”) (internal citations omitted).
42
Id. at 501–504.
43
Id. at 500.
44
Id.
36
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45

arbitration in order for the final decision to be binding. The defining aspect of
arbitration, and arguably a key distinction between arbitration and civil litigation,
46
is the consent aspect of arbitration. Furthermore, unlike litigation, traditional
arbitration takes place outside the judicial process and the arbitrator is not a
47
judicial officer. In traditional litigation, the court has the ability to compel an
unwilling party, whereas in arbitration, the parties have already willingly agreed to
48
participate in the specified forum. Moreover, in arbitration, parties have the
49
ability to “craft arbitrations to their specific needs.” The parties have the luxury
of specifying the scope of the arbitrator’s authority as well as the procedural rules
50
that will apply to the proceedings. Alternatively, parties in litigation are subject
51
to predetermined guidelines and procedural rules. Additionally, the presiding
52
arbitrator’s decisions have no precedent for they are ad hoc decisions. Litigation,
53
once again, has strict precedent guidelines that apply to cases.
ii.

Delaware’s Arbitration Proceeding Versus Civil Litigation

Although labeled “arbitration,” the Delaware arbitration proceeding is in
54
reality a civil trial. When parties file their “petition for an arbitration proceeding,
the Chancellor” selects the arbitrator who will hear the case, not the parties
55
themselves.
Furthermore, the selected arbitrator is a presiding Delaware
Chancery Court judge, whereas in traditional arbitration, the selected arbitrator is a
third party. In addition, “many of the same rules” that govern discovery within
56
“the Chancery Court apply to the arbitration” proceeding.
iii. Traditional Arbitrators Versus Traditional Judges
Where arbitration is very similar to traditional litigation, in the sense that
both proceedings offer a set of remedies, a judge has many similar attributes to that
57
of an arbitrator. Much like a judge, an arbitrator, usually a neutral third party the
58
parties select, hears the evidence and renders a decision. And for this reason, an
59
arbitrator presiding over arbitration “may look and act much like a judge.”

45

Id.
Id. (“The parties’ voluntary agreement to resolve their dispute through a decision maker of their
choosing is the “‘essence of arbitration.’”) (quoting Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d
Cir.2003)).
47
Id. at 501.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 501–502
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 503.
59
Id.
46
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Yet aside from the large similarities, an arbitrator and a judge perform very
60
distinctive functions. As the court points out in its analysis, “[a]rbitrators act as a
‘private extraordinary Judge[], chosen by the Parties to give Judgments between
61
them.’ They are empowered by the parties’ consent and limited by the scope of
62
63
that consent.
They serve the parties.”
In comparing the attributes of an
arbitrator to that of a judge the court further stated, “Judges, on the other hand, are
64
empowered by their appointment to a public office.
They act according to
65
66
prescribed rules of law and procedure. They serve the public.”
iv.

Delaware Arbitration Proceeding Arbitrators Versus Traditional
Judges

As this article notes above, an arbitrator is usually a neutral third party that
67
both parties to a dispute select.
But in the case of Delaware’s arbitration
68
proceedings, this is not the case. Instead, a Delaware sitting judge presides over
69
the proceeding. The court finds that “it is this fact which distinguishes the
70
Delaware proceeding[s] from court-annexed arbitrations.”
And much like
traditional civil proceedings, in Delaware’s Chancery Court “the judge conducts
the proceedings in the Chancery courthouse with the assistance of Chancery Court
71
staff.” And, unlike a neutral third party arbitrator the parties pay, the Chancery
Court judge and staff are not compensated by the parties, but rather “are paid their
72
usual salaries for [their] arbitration work.”
Moreover, in traditional arbitration proceedings, if one party refuses to
comply, the other party may enforce the party’s obligation to comply through the
73
court system.
Alternatively, in Delaware, the judge and the arbitrator are
essentially the same people; therefore, the judge’s award results in a final judgment
74
that state power enforces. Beyond final awards, the judge acting as an arbitrator
75
has “interim, interlocutory, or partial orders and awards” at his disposal. These

60

Id.
Id. (quoting A DICTIONARY OF ARBITRATION AND ITS TERMS 27, at 27–28 (Katharine Seide ed.,
Oceana Publications, Inc.) (1970).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 502. (“A sitting judge presides over the proceeding. It is this fact which distinguishes the
Delaware proceeding from court-annexed arbitrations where third parties sit as arbitrators. Just as in any
other civil case, the judge conducts the proceedings in the Chancery courthouse with the assistance of
Chancery Court staff.”).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. (citing Del. Ch. Ct. R. 98).
75
Id. (citing Del. Ch. Ct. R. 98).
61
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awards, along with final arbitration awards, are binding amongst the parties to the
76
same extent as any court orders would be. As such, these arbitration awards are
essentially identical to a judge’s orders in a traditional civil trial, with one major
difference—since arbitration proceedings are confidential, the ruling or reasoning
77
behind the ruling is not published.
This effectively serves to conceal the
arbitrator’s factual findings and the legal rules the arbitrator applied or, quite
78
possibly, the judge should have applied. Therefore, to conclude the comparison
of Delaware’s arbitration proceeding with that of a traditional arbitration
proceeding and traditional civil litigation the court justly states:
In the Delaware proceeding, the parties submit their dispute to a sitting judge acting
pursuant to state authority, paid by the state, and using state personnel and
facilities; the judge finds facts, applies the relevant law, determines the obligations
of the parties; and the judge then issues an enforceable order. This procedure is
79
sufficiently like a civil trial that Publicker Industries governs.

And the court ultimately concludes, “that the right of access applies to the
Delaware proceeding created by section 349 of the Delaware Code. The portions
of that law and Chancery Court Rules 96, 97, and 98, which make the proceeding
80
confidential, violate that right.”
V.

LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE TEST APPLIED TO DELAWARE’S ARBITRATION
PROCEEDING

Based on the aforementioned analysis of the noticeable similarities between
Delaware’s arbitration proceeding and traditional civil litigation, the Court
ultimately found “that the Delaware procedure is a civil judicial proceeding, [and]
it is not necessary to reiterate the thorough analysis of the experience and logic test
81
performed by the Court of Appeals in Publicker Industries.” However, had the
82
court applied both tests, the results would ultimately be the same. In its short
analysis the court states:
These benefits accrue to civil disputes among corporate citizens as well as to those
between individuals, both of whom can participate in the Delaware procedure.
Diverse business disputes may be submitted to the Chancery Court, and open
proceedings can serve to educate the public about important legal and social issues.
Public scrutiny discourages witness perjury and promotes confidence in the
integrity of the courts. Public confidence that court proceedings are fair is
protected when the public can access those proceedings and understand the
83
reasoning supporting judicial findings and rulings.

Regarding the logic aspect of the test, the court goes on to state:

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The public benefits of openness are not outweighed by the defendants’ speculation
that such openness will drive parties to use alternative non-public fora to resolve
their disputes. Even if the procedure fell into disuse, the judiciary as a whole is
strengthened by the public knowledge that its courthouses are open and judicial
84
officers are not adjudicating in secret.

IV. IMPACT
The court’s ruling in Strine may not be as big a blow as many may set it out
to be for the state of Delaware, which is constantly yearning to be on the leading
edge of corporate governance, and for the most part, it accomplishes this goal.
Arbitration for dispute resolution is still a relatively new option for legal conflicts,
85
especially in Delaware. Since arbitration is largely confidential, many business
entities remain skeptical of this procedure and feel more at ease with traditional
86
litigation. As this article mentioned earlier, predictability is one of the enticing
87
qualities of Delaware’s judicial system. Based on case precedent, with largely
majority opinions, corporations incorporated in Delaware feel a sense of
88
uniformity within the judicial system. Putting this system behind closed doors
89
may ultimately strip this enticing feature away.
Furthermore, many large
90
corporations continuously prefer the traditional litigation route. Corporations
rarely negotiate choice of law and forum clauses when drafting agreements, opting
91
to utilize standard boilerplate languages instead.
So, on its face, the Strine
decision may seem like a blow to the state of Delaware and its ability to continue
to entice many large corporations to incorporate within their state, but in actuality
92
it may just be the opposite. Many corporations may possibly have no concern

84

Id.
Katherine Blair, Partner, K & L Gates, Keynote Address at the Journal of Business,
Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds
For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 382 (stating “It is fairly new in the legal community so it’s not used as
much, but it has been used in agreements and I know that parties have discussed putting it in there.”).
86
Monica Shilling, Partner, Proskauer Rose, LLP, Keynote Address at the Journal of Business,
Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds
For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 384. Shilling commented that her clients tend to always prefer
litigation:
So in Delaware, especially on the corporate side, you have predictability, ease of
use, and flexibility, and so we all use Delaware. Twenty years ago, you didn’t
see people all that comfortable with LLC’s because they weren’t and now you
see LLC’s all over the place. So when I think about that, and I think about what
this sort of arbitration system could do, on the litigation side, it’s really
disappointing that we’re stuck right now. In my deals, I tend to work with
financial service clients. They tend to have a confidence about their ability to win
anything; so you almost never see arbitration provisions in those documents.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Robert Anderson, Professor, Pepperdine Univ. Sch. of Law, Keynote Address at the Journal of
Business, Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the
85
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with such a decision.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Delaware arbitration proceeding is in actuality a civil
litigation proceeding that the Delaware courts have simply labeled as “arbitration.”
The process of traditional arbitration differs greatly from that of Delaware’s
“arbitration” proceedings. Furthermore, the process of Delaware’s arbitration
proceeding has many noticeable similarities to that of civil litigation. And, such
similarities are not minute, but rather are the attributes that define civil litigation
and break it way from arbitration. Therefore, the district court was correct in
finding that Delaware’s arbitration proceeding was a clear violation of the First
Amendment. Indeed, such a decision has not stripped away Delaware’s
competitive edge or arguably affected it at all, evidenced by the panel first hand
experiences with their clients’ lack of desire to opt into arbitration versus
traditional litigation. Henceforth, the decision in the Strine case has not eliminated
the appeal of incorporating in Delaware for large public companies, for such
companies would not have consented to arbitration even if it were an option.

Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J.
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 385. When Professor Anderson asked the speakers, “And I think a
big question about this so…why hadn’t more companies arbitrated under this procedure?” the general
response from panelists was, “It’s the last on the list, if anything. It’s a throw-in.” This exemplifies the
desire for many large corporations to choose traditional litigation over arbitration.

